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PROCESS IS DUE: THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
PREQUALIFICATION OF MEDICINES
ABSTRACT
A lack of access to essential medicines is a significant—but largely
preventable— contributor to mortality, primarily in low-income countries. The
World Health Organization (WHO)—through its Prequalification of Medicines
Programme—prequalifies drugs that meet minimum quality standards and are
used in the treatment of certain conditions, such as HIV and tuberculosis. To
date, nearly all of the drugs that the WHO has prequalified have been produced
in middle- and high-income countries.
Many international drug procurement entities and donors require the drugs
they purchase from low- and middle-income countries to be prequalified. These
purchasers represent a sizeable portion of the essential medicines market. This
has effectively made the Prequalification Programme a de facto drug approval
authority for manufacturers in many low- and middle-income countries.
However, there is currently no way for manufacturers to challenge a
prequalification decision before an independent body.
This Comment argues that the WHO is failing to uphold customary
international due process law, specifically the right to a fair trial, because it
does not provide manufacturers whose products are denied prequalification or
removed from the prequalification list the opportunity to challenge the decision
before an independent body. It also argues that providing these manufacturers
the opportunity to challenge an adverse decision is important because of the
WHO’s emphasis on human rights promotion and the great power the
Programme holds over many manufacturers. It proposes that the WHO adopt
an independent review panel before which manufacturers may challenge the
Prequalification Programme’s decision to reject or delist a product.
This Comment also proposes that the WHO—to facilitate the production of
essential medicines in low-income countries—give manufacturers in these
countries access to an additional approval pathway called “conditional
prequalification.” Conditional prequalification would likely provide eligible
manufacturers—whose products meet a lower defined threshold of compliance
with good manufacturing practices than is currently required—access to
additional segments of the essential medicines market. Conditional
prequalification would be contingent upon manufacturers’ adherence to a plan
to achieve full compliance within a specified period.
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INTRODUCTION
More than a quarter of the world’s population lacks access to essential
medicines.1 This lack of access results in ten million preventable deaths per
year—four million in Africa and South-East Asia alone.2 One major factor
contributing to this lack of access is the fact that drugs are not produced in the
places where they are most needed.3 Africa, for example, is home to a large share
of the global disease burden, including 70% of the world’s HIV cases and 90%
of malaria deaths.4 But, an estimated 80% or more of all pharmaceuticals in
Africa are imported.5 This misalignment can increase the cost of the drugs and
leave people vulnerable to supply interruptions.6 The finished pharmaceutical
products (FPPs) and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) that have been
prequalified by the World Health Organization (WHO) reflect this larger trend
of geographic production misalignment. As of April 2015, less than 1% of
prequalified FPPs7 and no prequalified APIs were manufactured in low-income
countries8—the countries in greatest need of these medicines.9
Although the goal of the WHO is not to supplant national drug regulatory
authorities,10 its Prequalification of Medicines Programme (Prequalification
Program) has become the de facto drug approval authority for essential medicine
manufacturers operating in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
Despite wielding this considerable authority, there is no formal independent
review mechanism by which manufacturers can challenge a withdrawal11 or
1
ACCESS TO MED. FOUND., The 2016 Access to Medicine Index: Methodology 2015, at 1, 6 (2015),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s22176en/s22176en.pdf; Paul Hunt, Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Health, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines,
U.N. Doc. A/63/263, annex, at 15 (Aug. 11, 2008).
2
Hunt, supra note 1.
3
See Jicui Dong & Zafar Mirza, Supporting the Production of Pharmaceuticals in Africa, 94 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 71, 71 (2016).
4
Id.
5
Id. (estimating that imported pharmaceuticals make up 79% of those consumed in Africa); Tefo Pheage,
Dying from a Lack of Medicines, AFR. RENEWAL ONLINE, Dec. 2016–Mar. 2017, http://www.un.org/
africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/dying-lack-medicines (estimating that 98% of
pharmaceuticals consumed in Africa are produced outside of the continent).
6
Id.
7
This Comment uses the terms “drugs” and “FPPs” interchangeably.
8
See Dong & Mirza, supra note 3.
9
Petra Brhlikova et al., Aid Conditionalities, International Good Manufacturing Practice Standards and
Local Production Rights: A Case Study of Local Production in Nepal, 11 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1, 4 (2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4470019/pdf/12992_2015_Article_110.pdf.
10
About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about-us (stating that the goal of the WHO is
to “build[] a better, heathier future for people all over the world”) (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
11
This Comment uses both “withdrawal” and “delisting” to refer to situations in which a product’s
prequalification is withdrawn or cancelled.
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denial of prequalification of their products. This lack of review raises
international due process concerns,12 particularly a manufacturer’s right to a fair
trial. In addition, essential medicines13 are overwhelmingly needed in lowincome countries, but prequalified essential medicines are almost exclusively
produced in middle- and high-income countries.14 To remedy this misalignment,
which is resulting in negative health and economic consequences, the WHO
should add another prequalification pathway for manufacturers of drugs
produced in low-income countries.
Prequalification is a process through which the WHO assesses and approves
the product quality and manufacturing processes of FPPs and APIs that are used
to combat priority diseases, including HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.15 Many
international drug procurement entities and donors, including U.N. agencies,
only purchase medicines for priority diseases that have been prequalified by the
WHO or another “stringent regulatory authority.”16 These procurement agencies
do not currently consider any drug regulatory authorities in LMICs to be
“stringent.”17 Thus, gaining the WHO prequalification stamp of approval is
effectively the only way for manufacturers in LMICs to sell their products to

12

This Comment uses “due process” to refer specifically to procedural due process.
The WHO defines essential medicines as “those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the
population.” Essential Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_
def/en/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). This definition encompasses more medicines than the ones the WHO
currently prequalifies. However, there is significant overlap between the two categories.
14
Dong & Mirza, supra note 3.
15
WORLD HEALTH ORG., FORTY-SEVENTH REPORT OF THE WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE ON
SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS: WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 981, at 28 (2013)
[hereinafter WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 981]. The Prequalification of Medicines Program also
involves the review and approval of “quality control laboratories.” Id. at 30. Although the quality control
laboratories are important, this Comment will focus only on the prequalification of FPPs and APIs.
16
SKHUMBUZO NGOZWANA ET AL., AFRICAN UNION, PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING PLAN FOR
AFRICA: BUSINESS PLAN 32 (2012) (“Without exception, [international donor entities and non-governmental
organizations] require that products be prequalified by WHO or approved by a stringent regulatory authority.”).
17
Generally, the definition of “stringent regulatory authority” only includes authorities that participate in
the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use (ICH), as well as special regulatory schemes found in Canada, the European Union, or the United
States; members of the ICH currently include the United States, the European Union, some European countries,
Japan, and Australia. See, e.g., THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDE TO
GLOBAL FUND POLICIES ON PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH PRODUCTS 15 (2017);
UNITAID, QUALITY ASSURANCE OF HEALTH PRODUCTS 2 n.6 (2017). The WHO uses a nearly identical definition
of stringent regulatory authority. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO A STRINGENT
REGULATORY ORGANIZATION AS APPLICABLE TO THE STRINGENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY (SRA) GUIDELINE
1 (2017), https://extranet.who.int/prequal/sites/default/files/documents/75%20SRA%20clarification_February
2017_0.pdf.
13
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international drug procurement entities and donors—a large and profitable share
of the essential medicines market in these countries.18
The evidence indicates that compliance with the WHO’s Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs)—a prerequisite for prequalification—is
particularly challenging for manufacturers based in low-income countries
because of financial constraints, a lack of technical expertise, and inconsistent
or nonexistent enforcement of GMP standards by national regulatory
authorities.19 This lack of enforcement allows manufacturers who do not comply
with stringent GMPs to continue to operate, but results in an exclusion from the
international donor market.20
The lack of access to quality-assured essential medicines results in the deaths
of millions of people each year.21 Individuals in low-income countries
disproportionately succumb to diseases that can be easily treated with timely
access to quality medicines.22 In 2015, an estimated 1.6 million people in Africa
alone died from malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV-related illnesses.23 This lack of
access has been driven by a host of factors, including unaffordable drug prices
and an inadequate supply of medicines.24 Strategies to address these challenges
include the proliferation of low-cost generic medicines, as well as a
strengthening of the domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing industries in
countries with the highest disease burdens.25
Given the Prequalification Program’s approval authority, the WHO
possesses great power over both consumers and drug manufacturers in lowincome countries. On the one hand, the WHO performs an essential role in
countries with weak regulatory authorities, protecting consumers from the

18
See, e.g., NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16 (“The majority of the market for [anti-retrovirals] is
controlled by the international donor entities and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).”).
19
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ASSESSMENT OF MEDICINES REGULATORY SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM 26 ASSESSMENT REPORTS, at 16 (2010); Brhilkova et
al., supra note 9, at 9.
20
Brhilkova et al., supra note 9, at 9.
21
Hunt, supra note 1; Pheage, supra note 5.
22
See Pheage, supra note 5.
23
Id.
24
MARGARET CHAN, TEN YEARS IN PUBLIC HEALTH: 2007–2017, at 14–15 (2017).
25
See, e.g., NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6; Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The
Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under
the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 977–79 (2007); Kinsley Rose Wilson et al., The Make
or Buy Debate: Considering the Limitations of Domestic Production in Tanzania, 8 GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 1–2
(2012).
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dangers of substandard medicines.26 But, on the other hand, the WHO is failing
to uphold customary international due process principles, specifically the right
to a fair trial, because it does not allow manufacturers whose products are denied
prequalification or delisted an opportunity to challenge these decisions.
Similarly, by failing to give manufacturers a way to challenge a denial or
delisting, the WHO is ignoring its immense power and deviating from its role as
a promoter of human rights.27
Customary international law refers to rules that emanate from the “general
and consistent practice of states[,]” which are followed out of “a sense of legal
obligation.”28 Customary international law is binding on international
organizations, such as the WHO, as well as states.29 Specifically, customary
international law obligates international organizations that are performing a
governmental or quasi-governmental function to provide persons whose rights
and freedoms may be infringed an opportunity to be heard before an independent
and impartial tribunal.30 Here, the WHO—through the Prequalification
Program—is performing a governmental function in deciding to grant, deny, or
withdraw a product’s prequalification. Additionally, an adverse decision
implicates manufacturers’ cognizable right to engage in commercial activity,
particularly because of these decisions’ large economic implications.31
This Comment argues that the WHO should implement a two-part solution
to protect and advance international due process principles and to spur the
production of pharmaceuticals in low-income countries. First, the WHO should
introduce an independent review panel, comprised of independent subject matter
experts from geographically and economically diverse regions. Giving
manufacturers whose products are either denied prequalification or delisted the
opportunity to contest such a ruling before this panel would bring the
Prequalification Program into compliance with international procedural due
process principles. This Comment argues that the introduction of this review
mechanism would also comport with the WHO’s emphasis on human rights
promotion and the Prequalification Program’s immense authority. The
26
Ellen F.M. ‘t Hoen et al., A Quiet Revolution in Global Public Health: The World Health
Organization’s Prequalification of Medicines Programme, 35 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 137, 154 (2014).
27
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
28
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
29
See Lisa Clarke, Responsibility of International Organizations Under International Law for the Acts
of Global Health Public-Private Partnerships, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 55, 73 (2011); infra Section II.A.
30
See Bardo Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process
Rights, 3 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 437, 445–46 (2006).
31
Infra Section II.B.

FUCHS_FINALPROOFS2

2019]

1/30/2019 1:39 PM

PROCESS IS DUE

649

introduction of an independent review panel would bring practical benefits, such
as improving the accuracy of a prequalification decision, increasing the
accountability of the Prequalification team, and increasing manufacturer
confidence in, and respect for, prequalification decisions.
Second, this Comment argues that the WHO should institute a procedure that
enables manufacturers in lower income countries32 to have their drugs
“conditionally” prequalified, based on a lower defined threshold of compliance
with WHO GMPs than is currently required. The still relatively high level of
compliance, coupled with additional oversight, would be a practical way to
increase the supply of quality-assured drugs produced in low-income countries.
The prequalification would be “conditional” because manufacturers’ approval
for a drug would be contingent upon their adherence to a WHO-approved plan
that leads to full GMP compliance within a specified period. Conditional
prequalification has the potential to increase the supply of—and subsequent
access to—essential medicines, help develop the pharmaceutical industries in
lower income countries, bring economic benefits to these countries, and
incentivize manufacturers in lower income countries to fully comply with WHO
GMPs.
This Comment begins with an overview of the Prequalification Program’s
procedures and the important role the Program plays in providing people in
LMICs access to high-quality essential medicines. Part I also lays out the
challenges, including GMP compliance, that manufacturers in low-income
countries face when attempting to have their products prequalified. Part II
discusses procedural due process under international law and concludes that the
WHO should allow its decisions to be reviewed by an independent and impartial
body. Part III examines the review mechanism of another international
organization—the World Bank’s Inspection Panel—which offers lessons on
how to structure the proposed Prequalification independent review panel. Part
IV sets forth the suggested Prequalification independent review panel, as well
as the conditional prequalification proposal for manufacturers in lower income
countries. This Comment concludes by suggesting that these proposed changes
would lead to substantial health, economic, and institutional gains.

32
This Comment uses “lower income countries” to refer to those countries whose gross national income
per capita is below or equal to $1,580 in 2017. Manufacturers in these lower income countries would be eligible
for “conditional prequalification.” As will be discussed, infra Section III.B., “lower income countries”
encompasses all low-income countries and the poorest middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank.
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ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES AND PREQUALIFICATION

Improving access to high-quality essential medicines has had a central place
on the international development agenda for at least the last roughly two
decades.33 Despite significant progress over the last forty years,34 far too many
lives are still lost due to a lack of timely access to effective and affordable drugs
for preventable or treatable diseases.35 In response to concerns about the quality
of essential medicines that international donors and drug procurement entities
were purchasing, U.N. partners created the Prequalification of Medicines
Programme in 2001.36 Since that time, the Prequalification Program’s role and
influence has increased dramatically.
A. Strategies for Increasing Access to Quality Essential Medicines
Two of the most prominent strategies to increase access to quality essential
medicines are ensuring greater supply of generic medicines and increasing the
production of drugs—typically generics—in the countries where they are most
needed. Affordability is a critical component of access.37 The WHO has
recognized that generic medicines play an important role in making medicines
more affordable.38 The manifestation of this strategy can be seen in the WHO’s
Essential Medicines List, which serves as the basis for many national essential
medicines lists.39 About 95% of the medicines on the latest WHO list are generic
products.40
Generic drugs are “identical—or bioequivalent—to a brand name drug in
dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance

33
See G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 16
(Oct. 21, 2015) (“Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality
essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and
vaccines for all.”); id. at 17 (“[P]rovide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance
with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health . . . .”); G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations
Millennium Declaration, ¶ 20 (Sept. 8, 2000) (“We also resolve . . . [t]o encourage the pharmaceutical industry
to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries.”).
34
It is estimated that the fraction of people globally without access to life-saving medicines decreased
from “less than half the world’s population” in 1975 to about one-third in 1999. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE
WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 61 (2004).
35
See Hunt, supra note 1; Pheage, supra note 5.
36
A.J. van Zyl, WHO Prequalification of Medicines Programme, 25 WHO DRUG INFO. 231, 231 (2011).
37
MDG GAP TASK FORCE, U.N., DELIVERING ON THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 35 (2008).
38
Id. at 41.
39
REED F. BEALL, PATENTS AND THE WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (18th EDITION):
CLARIFYING THE DEBATE ON IP AND ACCESS 1 fig.1 (2016).
40
Id. at 2.
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characteristics and intended use.”41 Generics are legally marketed and sold after
the expiry of any patent and market exclusivities on the pioneer drug, or under
a voluntary or compulsory license from the manufacturer of the pioneer
product.42
Generics are almost always cheaper than their brand-name equivalents
because of the lower upfront research and development costs borne by
manufacturers, as well as the greater market competition that normally follows
the introduction of generic medicines.43 To gain approval in many regulatory
systems, including the WHO’s Prequalification Program, generic drug
manufacturers are not required to replicate the costly and time-consuming
animal and human clinical studies required of pioneer drugs.44 They must simply
demonstrate that the generic product provides the same clinical benefits to
humans as an already approved drug.45 In addition, once applicable patent and
market exclusivities on a brand-name drug expire, multiple generic drugs are
often introduced into the marketplace within a short time frame, typically
resulting in increased competition and lower costs.46 One notable exception to
the entry of multiple generics is for drugs intended to treat rare conditions, for
which there is a small market.47
Another strategy to increase access to essential medicines is through the
expansion of the domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in countries

41
Rafael Alfonso-Cristancho et al., Definition and Classification of Generic Drugs Across the World, 13
APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y S5, S6 (Supp. 2015) (citing the FDA’s definition).
42
See WORLD TRADE ORG., TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 7 (2006), https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfactsheet_pharma_2006_e.pdf.
43
MDG GAP TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 41; Generic Drug Facts, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/GenericDrugs/ucm16
7991.htm (last updated June 4, 2018).
44
See, e.g., World Health Org., Generic Medicines, 30 WHO DRUG INFO. 370, 370–71 (2016); Generic
Drug Facts, supra note 43.
45
Generic Drug Facts, supra note 43. Demonstrating bioequivalence typically requires human trials, but
only in about twenty-four to thirty-six individuals, compared to the hundreds or thousands of human subjects
required in the clinical trials of pioneer drugs. FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm134444.htm (last updated Dec. 4, 2017).
46
Generic Drug Facts, supra note 43.
47
See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raisesprotests.html (describing the lack of competition (and large price increases) surrounding a sixty-two-year old
drug, Daraprim—for which there were no effective patents or exclusivities—used to treat a rare condition,
toxoplasmosis).
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with the highest disease burden.48 The African Union49 has strongly endorsed
this strategy:
[T]he development of the sector will provide a basis for sustainable
treatment programmes as the contribution that donors can make
plateaus or even begins to diminish. The sector can also make a
contribution to economic growth through enhanced exports, increased
intra-African trade, emergence of supportive industries and the
reduced reliance on imports that use up precious hard currency and for
which only limited regulatory oversight by our national regulatory
authorities is possible.50

However, for the benefits of affordable essential medicines to be realized,
the drugs produced domestically must be of an acceptable quality. Ensuring
adequate quality has proven to be incredibly challenging, with some experts
labeling the problem of substandard medicines a potential “public-health
crisis.”51 Substandard medicines “are authorized medical products that fail to
meet either their quality standards or their specifications, or both.”52
Substandard medicines do not include deliberately counterfeit drugs.
People living in LMICs are particularly vulnerable to being supplied
substandard drugs.53 The drug regulatory authorities in many LMICs lack the
necessary resources and capacity to vigilantly monitor the quality of drugs
within their territory.54 For example, it is estimated that 34% of drugs in subSaharan African are substandard or counterfeit.55 The conditional
prequalification proposal, as well as the independent review panel to a lesser
extent, would help alleviate these dual concerns of supply and quality by
stimulating the production of quality-assured essential medicines in lower
48
See, e.g., NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 25; Wilson et al.,
supra note 25, at 2.
49
The African Union is an intergovernmental organization comprised of fifty-five member states.
Member State Profiles, AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/memberstates (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). Its vision is
“[a]n integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in
global arena.” Vision and Mission, AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/en/about/vision (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
50
NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
51
Atholl Johnston & David W. Holt, Substandard Drugs: A Potential Crisis for Public Health, 78
BRITISH J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 218, 218 (2014).
52
World Health Org. Res. A70/23, annex, Member State Mechanism on Substandard/Spurious/FalselyLabelled/Falsified/Counterfeit Medical Products, at 34 (Mar. 20, 2017).
53
Johnston & Holt, supra note 51, at 229 (noting that patients may also be supplied substandard
medicines in developed countries, but at a very low rate).
54
Raffaella Ravinetto et al., Fighting Poor-Quality Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries:
The Importance of Advocacy and Pedagogy, 9 J. PHARMACEUTICAL POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 2 (2016).
55
Tariq Almuzaini et al., Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines: A Systematic Review of the Literature,
3 BMJ OPEN 1, 4 (2013).
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income countries. Increasing access to quality-assured essential medicines
continues to be a challenging, but critically important, task.
B. Prequalification Process
Recognizing the significant risk that substandard medicines pose, U.N.
partners established the Prequalification Program as a pilot project in 2001.56 At
the time (and still to this day), most generic drugs used in LMICs were
manufactured in India.57 However, international procurement entities had
reservations about whether the Indian drug regulatory authorities were able to
adequately assess the quality of these generic drugs.58 These concerns were
further elevated by the recognition that low-cost, quality-assured generic drugs
were needed to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic.59 Largely in response to these
developments, WHO Member States asked the organization to assess the quality
of medicines so that international procurement entities could ensure the drugs
they purchased met recognized standards of quality.60 In March 2001, the
Prequalification of Medicines Programme was launched, initially as a pilot
project.61
The Prequalification Program is technically a U.N. program that the WHO
administers.62 The purpose of the Prequalification Program has remained the
same during its relatively brief history: “to assess the quality, safety, and efficacy
of medicinal products.”63 However, the types of medicines it prequalifies has
expanded. Initially, the WHO only prequalified FPPs used to treat HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria. Now, hepatitis C medications, zinc, and products used
for reproductive health are also eligible for prequalification.64 An FPP—as the

56
van Zyl, supra note 36. The Program was initiated by the Interagency Pharmaceutical Coordination
Group, a group of senior pharmaceutical advisors from U.N. agencies including the WHO and other international
organizations (such as the African Development Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria), who meet every six months to better coordinate their pharmaceutical policies and the technical advice
they give. The Interagency Pharmaceutical Coordination Group, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/
medicines/areas/policy/ipc/en/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
57
‘t Hoen et al., supra note 26, at 138.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 142; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO PREQUALIFICATION: PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2013).
60
‘t Hoen et al., supra note 26, at 138.
61
WHO, THE INTERAGENCY PHARMACEUTICAL COORDINATION GROUP: TEN YEARS OF IPC: REPORT ON
ACHIEVEMENTS 1996–2006, at 3 (2007), http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/IPC_En.pdf.
62
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 981, supra note 15.
63
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/prequalification-of-medicines-by-who.
64
Id.; see In the Lead-Up to Paris AIDS Conference, WHO Prequalifies First Generic Hepatitis C
Medicine and First HIV Self-Test, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/news/2017/1st_
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name implies—is the “finished dosage form of a pharmaceutical product, which
has undergone all stages of manufacture, including packaging in its final
container and labelling.”65 In October 2010, the WHO began prequalifying
APIs.66 An API is the biologically active ingredient in a drug that is intended to
have a “direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention
of disease, or to have [a] direct effect in restoring, correcting or modifying
physiological functions in human beings.”67
There are five general components of the Prequalification process:
(1) invitation, (2) dossier submission, (3) assessment, (4) site inspection, and
(5) decision.68 First, the WHO, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and
AIDS, United Nations Children’s Fund, and UNITAID69 invite all interested
manufacturers to submit an expression of interest for specified medications.70
Second, interested manufacturers may submit comprehensive data—called the
dossier—on the specified pharmaceutical product.71 The dossier includes data
on the purity of ingredients in the product, the stability of the product, clinical
data, and product samples that allow for chemical and pharmaceutical analysis.72
Third, the submitted dossier is evaluated by a group of experts from the WHO
and national regulatory authorities73 that the WHO appoints.74 Fourth, following
the review of submitted data, inspectors visit manufacturing sites to check
compliance with WHO GMPs.75 The inspection team is made up of experts
appointed by the WHO, preferably from national regulatory authorities, and
coordinated and led by a WHO staff member.76 Compliance with the GMPs is a
particularly challenging step of the Prequalification process for manufacturers

generic-hepC_1stHIVself-test-prequalified/en/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). Zinc is used in the treatment of
children with acute diarrhea. Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
65
WORLD HEALTH ORG., FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE ON SPECIFICATIONS
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS: WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 961, at 375 (2011) [hereinafter
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961].
66
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 981, supra note 15.
67
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961, supra note 65, at 374–75.
68
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
69
“Unitaid is an international organisation that invests in innovations to prevent, diagnose and treat
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria more quickly, affordably and effectively. . . . Unitaid is a hosted
partnership of the [WHO].” About Us, UNITAID, https://unitaid.eu/about-us/#en (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
70
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
71
Id.
72
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961, supra note 65, at 380; Prequalification of Medicines by
WHO, supra note 63.
73
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
74
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961, supra note 65, at 381.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 382.
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and will be discussed in more detail below.77 Finally, the Prequalification
Program renders a decision on whether to include the FPP or API on its
respective prequalified list.78 Marketing approval from the national regulatory
authority in the country of manufacture is a precondition for WHO
Prequalification.79 However, national regulatory authorities in many LMICs are
underfunded and lack the technical capacity to enforce stringent standards.80
Manufacturers whose drugs achieve prequalification must submit data and
information for re-qualification every five years or as requested by the
Prequalification Program.81 The WHO also inspects manufacturers’ facilities “at
least once every three years.”82 If a prequalified product is found to be
noncompliant with prequalification standards, the WHO may suspend or remove
the product (and manufacturing sites) from the list of prequalified products.83 A
manufacturer may also voluntarily withdraw its product from the WHO
Prequalification list.84
If a manufacturer’s drug is delisted from the prequalified list or denied
prequalification, there is no formal way to challenge that decision before an
independent and impartial review body. As will be discussed in Part II, this lack
of an independent review body raises serious concerns about whether the WHO
is adhering to international procedural due process principles. The proposed
independent review panel would bring the WHO into compliance with these
principles. However, there are currently two stages of the prequalification
process that involve some kind of informal review. The first opportunity is after
the applicant’s dossier has been assessed. The “applicant may request a hearing
or meeting” with the team that reviewed its dossier to clarify any identified
issues.85 The other opportunity is following the site visit after the WHO issues

77

Infra Section I.E.
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
79
U.N., LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES BY THE UNCTAD SECRETARIAT 250 (2011).
80
Sten Olsson et al., Pharmacovigilance Activities in 55 Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A
Questionnaire-Based Analysis, 33 DRUG SAFETY 689, 691 (2010) (finding that only 47% of countries surveyed
reported having “a budget for pharmacovigilance activities”); infra Section I.E.
81
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961, supra note 65, at 386.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 386–87.
84
See, e.g., Fiona Fleck, Ranbaxy Withdraws All Its AIDS Drugs from WHO List, 329 BRITISH MED. J.
1205, 1205 (2004) (“Ranbaxy, an Indian generic drug company, has withdrawn all of its AIDS medicines from
the World Health Organization’s list of recommended drugs, not because they are unsafe or of poor quality, but
because they may not be as effective as they should be, a spokeswoman for WHO said.”).
85
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 961, supra note 65, at 381.
78
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an inspection report to the manufacturer that details the findings from its visit.86
WHO guidance states that any disagreements between the applicant
manufacturer and the WHO are resolved according to a standard operating
procedure.87 However, this standard operating procedure is not publicly
available.88
A 2010 survey conducted by the WHO Prequalification team revealed that
manufacturers who had previously had at least one product prequalified were
generally not satisfied with the Program’s problem resolution mechanisms.89
Overall, the Prequalification assessors and inspectors were meeting or exceeding
these manufacturers’ expectations for service delivery.90 But, manufacturers
identified several areas in which they felt the Prequalification Program was
coming up short, including “[o]pportunities for in-person communication during
the assessment process[,] . . . [q]uestion/problem resolution during
assessment[,] . . . [c]onsistency of membership in the team of assessors
throughout the process[,] . . . [and l]ocal/national representation in on-site
inspection teams.”91 It should be emphasized that respondents in this survey
were limited to those who had at least one product prequalified.92 To gain a more
complete view of manufacturers’ opinions of the Prequalification Program, it
would be necessary to survey manufacturers who have applied for, but never
prevailed in, having a drug prequalified; unfortunately, this information is
currently unavailable. The WHO states that the results of this survey would be
used to improve the current Program, an important goal given the great influence
the Program has in many LMICs.93
C. Prequalification Program: The Developing World’s Drug Approval
Agency
The WHO—through its Prequalification Program—has in many ways
become the de facto drug approval authority in many LMICs. The governments
of LMICs often use the WHO’s list of prequalified medicines to guide their

86

Id. at 383.
Id.
88
The fact that the standard operating procedures are not publicly available raises its own set of concerns
that are beyond the purview of this Comment.
89
See WHO, WHO Prequalification Programmes, 24 WHO DRUG INFO. 293, 296 (2010).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 293.
87
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decisions on which medicines to purchase.94 Some African drug authorities, in
particular, have used WHO prequalification as a proxy in their own drug
assessment and approval processes.95 Similarly, large drug procurement
entities—including U.N. agencies and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)—require the drugs they purchase from
LMIC-based manufacturers to be prequalified, except in very limited
circumstances.96
These actors—LMIC governments, international donors, and international
drug procurement agencies—represent a substantial portion of the market for
medicines, particularly essential medicines, in LMICs.97 Unfortunately,
pinpointing the precise share of the essential medicines market that these actors
occupy is not currently possible “due to a lack of comparable data on
pharmaceutical expenditures” in many LMICs.98 Data from 2006 indicated that
public expenditures represented 23.1% of total pharmaceutical spending in lowincome countries and 33.5% in lower middle-income countries.99 The report,
however, cautions that the low income numbers do not capture the spending of
international donors and drug procurement entities, such as U.N. agencies, the
Global Fund, or the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(often referred to by its acronym: PEPFAR).100 International donors and

94
WHO Prequalification Financing Model – Questions and Answers, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://who.int/medicines/news/prequal_finance_model_q-a/en/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
95
Mary Moran et al., Registering New Drugs for Low-Income Countries: The African Challenge, 8 PLOS
MED. 1, 3 (2011).
96
See Procurement Agencies, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://extranet.who.int/prequal/information/
medicines-purchasing-organizations (last visited Nov. 25, 2018); Sourcing and Management of Health Products,
Medicines, GLOBAL FUND, https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/sourcing-management/quality-assurance/
medicines/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (“[I]mplementing Principal Recipients have three options when selecting
which antiretrovirals, antituberculosis medicines and antimalarial medicines to purchase. They can choose
medicines that have been either: 1. Prequalified by the World Health Organization Prequalification
Programme[;] 2. Authorized for use by a Stringent Drug Regulatory Authority[; or] 3. Recommended for use by
the Expert Review Panel.”). The Global Fund Expert Review Panel is only an option in the rare circumstance
when “only one or no product is available on the global market . . . .” Id. Additionally, no drug authorities in
LMICs currently qualify as “stringent.” See discussion supra note 17.
97
See NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16.
98
YE LU ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 2011: MEDICINE
EXPENDITURES 2 (2011); see also MANJIRI BHAWALKAR & ABEBA TADDESE, GUIDE TO TRACKING
PHARMACEUTICAL EXPENDITURES IN A HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2014) (noting that a lack of uniform methodology
for collecting detailed pharmaceutical expenditure data in LMICs inhibits comparisons of pharmaceutical
expenditures between countries).
99
LU ET AL., supra note 98, at 7 tbl.1.2.
100
See id. at 7 n.1. The amount of money these donors and procurement entities spent on pharmaceuticals
increased significantly after 2006. Id. From fiscal year 2005 through 2011, the congressionally funded PEPFAR
program purchased more than $1.2 billion in antiretroviral drugs to treat those infected with HIV. U.S. GOV’T
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procurement entities alone purchase billions of dollars of medication annually
for distribution in low-income countries.101 The Prequalification Program stamp
of approval is therefore critical for many LMIC-based drug manufacturers’
profitability and sustainability.
D. Left Out: Drug Manufacturers in Low-Income Countries
Although critically important, it has been nearly impossible for drug
manufacturers in low-income countries to get their products prequalified. In
April 2015, only three out of 419 WHO prequalified FPPs, and none of the
prequalified APIs were produced by a manufacturer in a low-income country.102
The results of a 2012 study examining all of the generic FPP and API dossiers—
from both low-income and non-low-income countries—that had been submitted
for Prequalification between 2007 and 2010 provides an interesting contrast.103
The authors—primarily WHO Prequalification officials—found that of the 178
dossiers accepted for review,104 60 (33.71%) had been prequalified as of
December 2011, while 54 (30.33%) had been cancelled or withdrawn.105 The
remaining 64 dossiers were presumably still under assessment at the time of the
study.
Although the data from these two studies do not reveal whether
manufacturers from low-income countries are applying for prequalification and
getting rejected or simply not applying, they do reveal three important trends.
First, the numbers unequivocally demonstrate that the medicines being
prequalified are not being produced in low-income countries they are often
destined for. Second, they show that the large international donor and national
LMIC market is out of reach for current and potential manufacturers of essential
medicines who are based in low-income countries. Finally, they suggest that the

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-483, PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF: DRUG SUPPLY
CHAINS ARE STRONGER, BUT MORE STEPS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE RISKS 1 (2013).
101
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
102
Brhlikova et al., supra note 9. Of the 419 FPPs, 119 were produced by high-income country
manufacturers while 297 were produced by middle-income country manufacturers. Id. Of the prequalified APIs,
3 were produced by high-income country manufacturers and 75 were produced by middle-income
manufacturers. Id.
103
Wondiyfraw Z. Worku et al., Deficiencies in Generic Product Dossiers as Submitted to the WHO
Prequalification of Medicines Programme, 9 J. GENERIC MEDS. 63, 64 (2012).
104
Id. at 63, 65. 245 dossiers had been submitted, but 45 (18.37%) were rejected either because “the
product was not invited to the programme or later due to the applicant’s failure to respond to the PQP queries in
a timely fashion (maximum 1 year).” Id. at 67.
105
Id. at 72. One notable finding is that HIV dossiers contained substantially fewer deficiencies than did
tuberculosis, malaria, and reproductive health dossiers for both FPPs and APIs. Id. at 73.
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WHO’s strategy of increasing the manufacturing capacity in countries with the
highest disease burden is largely failing.
E. Good Manufacturing Practices Pose a Particular Challenge for
Manufacturers in Low-Income Countries
The limited available evidence indicates that compliance with GMPs poses
a particular challenge for drug manufacturers in low-income countries.106 GMPs
are used by the Prequalification Program, as well as national regulatory
agencies,107 “to ensure the quality, safety and efficacy” of medicines.108 GMPs
prescribe minimum standards with which manufacturers must comply
throughout every stage of the manufacturing process.109 At the national and
Prequalification levels, GMPs are enforced by making compliance a
precondition to market entry and prequalification, respectively.110 If detected
and enforced, failure to comply with GMPs may result in the denial or
withdrawal of a drug’s marketing authorization.111 GMPs are aimed at ensuring
“products are consistently produced and controlled according to the quality
standards appropriate to their intended use and . . . . managing and minimizing
the risks inherent in pharmaceutical manufacture . . . .”112
Pharmaceutical regulators and industry groups in more than 100 countries—
primarily LMICs—use the WHO’s GMPs.113 However, manufacturers in lowincome countries generally do not comply with GMPs at a level that would allow
the drugs they produce to be prequalified.114 This is due in part to manufacturers

106

Brhlikova et al., supra note 9, at 9.
WHO, WHO Prequalification of Medicines Programme: WHO Launches the PQD Collaborative
Registration Procedure, 27 WHO DRUG INFO. 325, 325 (2013).
108
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT OF THE WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE ON
SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS: WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 986, at 90
(2014) [hereinafter WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 986].
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Regulations, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm090016.htm (last updated Nov.
1, 2018); Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
111
See, e.g., Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Regulations, supra note 110;
Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, supra note 63.
112
WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 986, supra note 108.
113
Joseph D. Nally, Worldwide Good Manufacturing Practices, in GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES
FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 335, 339 (Joseph D. Nally ed., 6th ed. 2007).
114
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 19, at 16, 21; Brhlikova et al., supra note 9, at 8 (“Domestic
producers report that compliance with the stringent standards of GMP is a major obstacle for domestic
production of affordable pharmaceutical products.”). The WHO conducted an assessment of the regulatory
systems in twenty-six sub-Saharan African countries and found that nine of the countries did not require that
manufacturers have any GMP certification; “only five . . . had published GMP guidelines meeting WHO
107
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lacking the requisite financial resources and technical expertise, as well as
operating in countries with weak national medical regulatory authorities.115 The
drug regulatory authorities of many low-income countries do not require GMP
compliance, poorly enforce compliance, or publish standards that do not fully
adhere to the minimum requirements of the WHO’s GMPs.116 This allows
manufacturers to continue to operate regardless of adherence to stringent
GMPs.117 These factors contribute to make compliance with the WHO’s GMPs
particularly challenging for manufacturers in lower income countries who seek
to have their drugs prequalified.
In sum, this Comment has drawn three crucial conclusions about the WHO’s
Prequalification Program, with particular focus on GMPs, and how that Program
affects access to essential medicines in LMICs. First, far too many people—
especially in low-income countries—do not have access to quality-assured
essential medicines. Second, the Prequalification Program has performed a
critical role in helping to ensure essential medicines meet minimum quality,
safety, and effectiveness standards. Third, by adopting this gatekeeper role, the
WHO—through the Prequalification Program—has become the de facto drug
approval authority in many low-income countries that currently lack the capacity
to verify the quality of many of the drugs in their territory. However,
manufacturers whose products are denied prequalification or delisted have no
formal way to challenge the WHO’s decision before an independent body, which
raises substantial international due process concerns.
II. DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Historically, international law exclusively governed the relationships
between states.118 However, this view that sovereigns are the sole actors in
international law is now obsolete.119 It is now generally accepted that
international organizations are also bound by at least some aspects of
international law.120 Customary international law requires international
organizations to provide individuals and companies the opportunity to be heard
standards[;]” and of the countries that did require compliance, they were generally poorly enforced. WORLD
HEALTH ORG., supra note 19.
115
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 19, at 6, 8, 12, 21; Brhlikova et al., supra note 9, at 9.
116
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 19.
117
Brhlikova et al., supra note 9, at 9.
118
Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1574 n.1 (2011) (citing Jeremy
Bentham, Principles of International Law, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 550 (John Bowring ed.,
Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1843)).
119
Id. at 1574.
120
See Clarke, supra note 29.
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before an independent and impartial tribunal when the organization is
performing a governmental or quasi-governmental function that determines the
rights and obligations of these individuals and companies.121 The WHO is
performing a governmental function in administering the Prequalification
Program, specifically in its decision to grant, deny, or revoke a product’s
prequalification. Further, under the European Court of Human Rights’
jurisprudence, entities have a cognizable right to engage in commercial activity,
particularly when the economic consequences of an adverse decision are
significant.122 Therefore, this Comment argues that by failing to provide
manufacturers whose drugs are denied prequalification or delisted the
opportunity to challenge the WHO’s decision before an impartial tribunal, the
WHO is failing to uphold international due process principles. It also argues that
the WHO should provide these manufacturers the opportunity to challenge a
denial or delisting because of the WHO’s emphasis on human rights promotion
and the Prequalification Program’s great power over many manufacturers.
A. Customary International Law Applies to International Organizations
International organizations are bound by at least some aspects of
international law, in particular customary international law. The major sources
of international law include international agreements or treaties, customary
international law, and “the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.”123 Customary international law has been defined as the “general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”124 States must follow customary international law, except when they
have consistently objected to a particular law each time the opportunity has
arisen or they expressly contract around it.125 States, however, are always bound
by customs that are considered jus cogens.126 Literally meaning “compelling
121
Fassbender, supra note 30, at 473–74; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; G.A.
Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration of Human Rights].
122
See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
123
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1. Additionally, “[j]udicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law.” Id.
124
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
125
Id. § 102 cmt. j; Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old
Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173, 176 (2010).
126
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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law,” jus cogens are “peremptory norm[s] of general international law.”127 Jus
cogens are rules that are so widely “accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole” that derogation is not permitted.128 Examples
of jus cogens include the prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and the use of
force principles found in the U.N. Charter.129
International organizations are obligated to respect international law,
including jus cogens130 and customary international law.131 In an advisory
opinion, the International Court of Justice found that “[i]nternational
organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any
obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
parties.”132 Further, to contract around customary international law, parties to an
agreement must do so expressly.133 This has led to the conclusion that
international organizations are bound by customary international law unless the
member states of that organization have expressly conveyed their intent to
deviate from it.134
Although at least one commentator has argued that procedural due process
in civil cases should constitute jus cogens,135 the European Court of Human
Rights—an influential court with a rich body of case law—has previously

127
Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter,
3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 72, 73 (2005).
128
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 126.
129
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 n.6 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
130
Kristina Daugirdas, How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations, 57 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 325, 346 (2016) (“Jus cogens norms bind IOs [(international organizations)] because states cannot, by
treaty, establish IOs that are authorized to violate jus cogens norms.”) (citations omitted).
131
Clarke, supra note 29. But see Daugirdas, supra note 130, at 331–35 (“In short, the answers that
scholars have given to the question of whether general international law binds IOs include: maybe, sometimes,
and always.”).
132
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion,
1980 I.C.J. Rep. 73, 89–90 (Dec. 20, 1980). Although the International Court of Justice has not always used the
term “general international law” consistently, it generally includes at least customary international law. See
Clarke, supra note 29; Daugirdas, supra note 130, at 333. But see Daugirdas, supra note 130, at 331–34, for an
argument that the International Court of Justice’s WHO-Egypt opinion does not shed much light on international
organizations’ obligations.
133
Daugirdas, supra note 130, at 348.
134
Id.
135
S.I. Strong, General Principles of Procedural Law and Procedural Jus Cogens, 122 PA. ST. L. REV.
357 (2018).
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stopped short of such a recognition.136 It has, however, observed that the right to
bring a civil claim before an independent tribunal is “one of the universally
recognised fundamental principles of law . . . .”137 Even if the right to bring a
civil claim before an independent tribunal is not considered a rule of jus cogens,
the WHO should still respect this principle because it is a part of customary
international law.138
Although due process is nearly always discussed in terms of obligations that
a state owes individuals, the United Nations and its organs are now bound by
these principles because they are increasingly asked to perform “tasks of global
governance that go beyond its traditional purposes and functions.”139 The
evolving authority of the United Nations (and its organs) is part of a larger shift
in global governance, including in the area of regulatory decision-making.140
Global actors, including international organizations, now perform regulatory
functions once reserved almost exclusively for states.141
It is often said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) form two-thirds
of the International Bill of Human Rights.142 Unlike the ICCPR, the UDHR is
not a binding treaty.143 However, many of the provisions found in both of these
documents, including the right to a fair trial, are now widely considered
customary law, which generally binds even non-parties.144 These two seminal
documents contain provisions expressly guaranteeing procedural due process,
specifically the right to a fair trial. Article 10 of the UDHR states: “[e]veryone
136
Al-Dulimi. v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 65–66 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng/?i=001-164515.
137
Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 17 (1975).
138
Fassbender, supra note 30, at 444 (“On the basis of constitutional and statutory rules and practices
common to a great number of States of all regions of the world, and as guaranteed by universal and regional
human rights instruments, rights of due process, or ‘fair trial rights,’ have been generally recognized in
international law protecting individuals from arbitrary or unfair treatment by State organs.”).
139
Id. at 467.
140
Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 695, 695 (2005).
141
Id.
142
See e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 340–41 & n.221 (1995–1996). The other document forming
this Bill of Rights is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Id. at 341 n.221.
143
Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L
HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (2004); Anne Lowe, Note, Customary International Law and International Human Rights Law:
A Proposal for the Expansion of the Alien Tort Statute, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 523, 537 (2013).
144
See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing the ICCPR as
customary international law); Lowe, supra note 143 (“[E]ven though the UDHR is not a binding treaty, it is
considered to be a source of customary international law, and, therefore, imposes binding international legal
obligations.”).
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is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.”145 Using similar language, Article 14 of the
ICCPR provides: “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, or
of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”146 The bifurcation of these provisions into “rights and
obligations” and “criminal charges” makes clear that the right to a fair trial
provided by these documents—and now customary law—applies to both civil
and criminal cases. Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)147 closely tracks the language of Article 14 of the ICCPR. It states that
“[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”148
The ECHR explicitly applies in both the civil and criminal context.
Although entities can contract around customary international law, there is
no evidence that the WHO Constitution or the Expert Committee Report that
formally endorsed the Prequalification Program even contemplated—much less
expressed a desire to deviate from—procedural due process. Therefore, the
WHO is obligated to respect procedural due process rights, specifically the right
to a fair trial.
B. Companies May Avail Themselves of Human Rights Protections
The theory that international organizations exercising governmental
authority over an individual are obligated to respect due process standards is
rooted in human rights law.149 Since applicants to the Prequalification Program
are companies, including corporations, an important question becomes whether
human rights apply to companies or if this body of law is reserved only for
natural persons. In other words, do companies have legal personality under
human rights law that would grant them rights similar to those afforded to
individuals?
Looking at the language of these international human rights agreements, as
well as the practice of regional human rights bodies, companies often do in fact
145
146
147
148
149

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 121.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 121.
Formally, it is called the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 121.
Fassbender, supra note 30.

FUCHS_FINALPROOFS2

2019]

1/30/2019 1:39 PM

PROCESS IS DUE

665

enjoy basic human rights, including the right to be heard before an independent
tribunal.150 The broad language found in the right to a fair trial provisions of
these international human rights agreements lends credence to the argument that
companies enjoy this right.151 The drafters of these documents used intentionally
broad language, rather than limiting it to simply “human beings.”152 Article 10
of the UDHR, Article 14 of the ICCPR, and Article 6 of the ECHR state that
“everyone” or “all persons” shall be entitled to a fair hearing before an
independent and impartial tribunal.153 Additionally, companies have long been
able to bring claims in the European Court of Human Rights.154 A prime
justification for extending human rights, particularly due process protections, to
companies is that companies, including corporations, are “merely associations
of individuals united for a special purpose.”155 Therefore, companies do enjoy
human rights protections.
C. Process Is Due
Having established that the WHO is generally bound by international
procedural due process rules and that companies have legal personality under
international human rights law, this Comment now turns to whether the
Prequalification Program, in particular, must provide participants access to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The United Nations has previously grappled
with a similar question in a different context.156 In 2005, the U.N. General
Assembly commissioned Professor Bardo Fassbender to conduct a study on the
due process concerns involved in the U.N. Security Council’s (UNSC) targeted
sanctions regime, specifically UNSC Resolution 1267, which sanctions
individuals and entities belonging to or associated with Al Qaeda or the

150
See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 197, 211–13 (2007). There are, however, limits on corporations’ human rights. For a discussion of these
limits, see Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 729, 751–
53 (2012).
151
Dhooge, supra note 150.
152
Id.
153
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 121; European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 121; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 121.
154
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 121, at art. 34 (“The Court may receive
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals . . . .”); see Winfried
H.A.M. van den Muijsenbergh & Sam Rezai, Corporations and the European Convention on Human Rights, 25
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 43, 49 (2012) (“Among the Convention rights always and easily
deemed applicable to corporations are the right to a fair trial . . . .”).
155
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment extends to corporations).
156
Fassbender, supra note 30, at 441.
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Taliban.157 The listing and delisting of these individuals, in particular, raised
significant due process concerns.158
Fassbender concluded that, under customary international law, the United
Nations and its organs must provide procedural due process if two conditions
are met.159 First, the United Nations or its organs must be exercising
“governmental or quasi-governmental authority” over individuals or entities.160
Second, the United Nations or its organs must be “taking action that adversely
affects, or has the potential of adversely affecting, the rights and freedoms of
individuals.”161 In the civil context the three human rights documents discussed
above—the UDHR, ICCPR, and ECHR—phrase this second condition as an
action that determines an individual’s “rights and obligations.”162 As discussed,
companies may assert this right to due process, specifically the right to a hearing
before an independent tribunal.163
The Prequalification Program’s decision to list and delist medicines satisfies
both criteria. First, the WHO, which is an organ of the United Nations, is
exercising a governmental or quasi-governmental function—through its
Prequalification Program—when it decides to grant, deny, or withdraw
prequalification approval. The approval and removal (or delisting) of
pharmaceutical products is a function primarily carried out by national
governments.164 The WHO itself states that “[m]edicines regulation is
essentially a public function.”165 Additionally, the ultimate purpose of the
Prequalification Program—the protection of public health166—has historically
been a government function. Therefore, the WHO is exercising a governmental,
or at the very least quasi-governmental, function in the administration of its
Prequalification Program.

157

Id. at 440–42.
Id. at 442–43.
159
Id. at 467, 474.
160
Id. at 467 (quoting KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 89 (2002)).
161
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
162
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
163
See supra note 149–55 and accompanying text.
164
Warren A. Kaplan & Richard Laing, Paying for Pharmaceutical Registration in Developing Countries,
18 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 237, 237 (2003). One exception is the European Union’s centralized procedure,
which allows a company to obtain a single market authorization for all of the member states in the European
Union. Ines M. Vilas-Boas & C. Patrick Tharp, The Drug Approval Process in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, 3
J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 459, 461 (1997).
165
World Health Org., Building Quality-Assured Manufacturing Capacity in Nigeria, 28 WHO DRUG
INFO. 425, 429 (2014).
166
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
158
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Second, the Prequalification Program is determining (or taking an action that
has a potentially adverse effect on) an entity’s cognizable right when it makes
the decision to deny prequalification or delist an already prequalified product.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to a fair trial covers
the right to engage in commercial activity, particularly when an adverse decision
would carry significant economic consequences.167
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the denial as well as
revocation of a license interferes with a legal person’s “civil” right168 for the
purposes of receiving a fair trial.169 In Benthem v. Netherlands, the court held
that a person possesses a civil right when someone’s application for a license is
denied.170 The applicant in Benthem sought a license to establish and operate a
gas station.171 Municipal authorities initially granted the license, but on appeal,
determined that the license should be refused.172 The European Court of Human
Rights held that the dispute over the license denial implicated a civil right within
the purview of the right to a fair trial.173 Additionally, the court specifically
rejected the government’s argument that this dispute did not concern a
substantive right because Mr. Benthem could obtain a license for a different
location.174 “[A] change of this kind—which anyway would have involved an
element of chance since it would have required a fresh application whose success
was in no way guaranteed in advance—might have had adverse effects on the
value of the business and of the goodwill . . . .”175 Thus, Mr. Benthem was

167
See Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 19 (1989); Benthem v. Netherlands, 97
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 16 (1985); Nuala Mole & Catharina Harby, The Right to a Fair Trial: A Guide to the
Implementation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in 3 HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS
13 (2d ed. 2006), https://rm.coe.int/168007ff49. Compare I.T.C. Ltd. v. Malta, App. No. 2629/06, Eur. Ct. H.R.
1, 11 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84144 (holding that one of the losing bidders for a public
contract had no civil right to the award of the contract for the purposes of a right to a fair trial), with Araç v.
Turquie, App. No. 69037/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76944, translated
by Google Translate (finding that a civil right was at issue for person who was excluded from all future public
tenders because of the serious economic consequences of the exclusion).
168
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 121. The European Court of Human Rights uses
the term “civil right” to refer to non-criminal rights covered by the right to a fair trial provision. Id.
169
Tre Traktörer AB, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19; Benthem, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16; see also
Mole & Harby, supra note 167 (citing cases involving licenses that the court held were covered by the right to
a fair trial).
170
Benthem, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16.
171
Id. at 9–10.
172
Id. at 10–11.
173
Id. at 16.
174
Id.
175
Id. (emphasis added).
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entitled to a fair trial before an independent tribunal following the denial of his
license application.176
The European Court of Human Rights came to the same conclusion—
namely that a civil right is at issue—when a license is revoked. In Tre Traktörer
AB v. Sweden, a restaurant that had previously been licensed to serve alcohol
had its license revoked by a local administrative board.177 After a rather long
procedural journey, the County Administrative Board—following an order by
the National Board of Health and Welfare—revoked the restaurant’s alcohol
license.178 The restaurant then appealed this decision back to the National Board
of Health and Welfare, which declined to review the County Administrative
Board’s decision.179 The European Court of Human Rights found that the
revocation of the license “adverse[ly] [affected] . . . the goodwill and value of
the restaurant.”180 The court therefore held that the alcohol license conferred a
right on the restaurant and thus the former licensee was entitled to a fair trial
before an independent tribunal.181
In contrast to the earlier licensing cases, the European Court of Human
Rights has more recently considered the right to engage in commercial activity
in the context of bids for a public tender.182 These recent decisions—I.T.C. Ltd.
v. Malta and Araç v. Turquie—indicate that the court is more likely to find that
a party possesses a right to engage in commercial activity when an adverse
decision would result in significant economic consequences, such as being
excluded from multiple—rather than just one—contract.183
In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Malta, the Maltese Ministry for Youth and Arts issued a
public call for tenders related to a national event, for which three companies
submitted bids.184 Following the announcement of the winning bid, one of the
companies that was not awarded the contract attempted to challenge the
Ministry’s decision in the judicial system.185 The European Court of Human
176

Id. at 16–17.
Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) 3, 13 (1989).
178
Id. at 12–13.
179
Id. at 13.
180
Id. at 19.
181
Id. The court also held that neither the County Administrative Board nor the National Board of Health
and Welfare constituted an independent tribunal. Id. at 20.
182
See I.T.C. Ltd v. Malta, App. No. 2629/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-84144; Araç v. Turquie, App. No. 69037/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 5 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-76944.
183
See I.T.C. Ltd., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11; Araç, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.
184
I.T.C. Ltd., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2.
185
Id. at 3–5.
177
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Rights held that “[t]he issuance of a call for tenders did not give any tenderer
any enforceable civil right against the issuer.”186 The court distinguished I.T.C.
Ltd. from the case decided a year earlier, Araç v. Turquie, in which the court
held that an applicant for a public tender did possess an enforceable civil right.187
In Araç, the applicant was excluded not only from the tender at issue, but also
all future tendering processes.188 “The [Araç] decision thus entailed very
[different] significant economic consequences for him.”189 Therefore, it appears
that the court takes account of the economic consequences at stake in
determining whether a legal person possesses a cognizable right for the purposes
of a fair trial.
Here, the Prequalification Program’s decision to deny or withdraw a drug’s
prequalification is interfering with a manufacturer’s civil right to engage in
commercial activity under both the licensing and more recent public tender lines
of cases. Under both lines, manufacturers enjoy this right because an adverse
decision by the Prequalification Program substantially restricts their ability to
engage in commercial activity—now and in the future—and carries significant
economic consequences for the manufacturers.
Similar to the denial of a license application in Benthem, and the revocation
of a license in Tre Traktörer AB, the denial or revocation of a product’s
prequalification status affects the “value and goodwill” of the manufacturer’s
operation. As the court made clear in Benthem, the fact that a manufacturer can
reapply for approval does not make the right to engage in commercial activity
unenforceable.190 The WHO’s decision to grant, deny, or withdraw a product’s
prequalification has a significant impact on manufacturers’ profitability and
sustainability.191 In other words, there are “direct links between the grant of the
license and the entirety of the applicant’s commercial activities.”192
Under the public tender cases, manufacturers under the Prequalification
Program are more similar to the applicant in Araç than the one in I.T.C. Ltd. Like
the applicant in Araç,193 a manufacturer whose product is denied prequalification
or delisted is excluded not from one contract, but from all contracts with drug
procurement entities that require the drugs they purchase to be prequalified. As
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 8.
Araç, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.
Id. at 4–5.
I.T.C. Ltd., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11.
Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 16 (1985).
See supra Section I.D.
Benthem, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16; see also supra Section I.C.
Araç, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.

FUCHS_FINALPROOFS2

670

1/30/2019 1:39 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:643

discussed, this category of purchasers constitutes a sizeable and profitable
portion of the essential medicines market.194 Therefore, an adverse decision by
the Prequalification Program carries significant economic consequences. Under
customary international law, manufacturers whose drugs are denied
prequalification or delisted are entitled to a fair hearing before an independent
tribunal.
D. WHO: Human Rights Promotion and Power
In addition to alleviating due process concerns, the WHO should allow
manufacturers whose products are delisted or denied prequalification the
opportunity to challenge such a decision due to its role as a promoter of human
rights and the immense power it exerts over many drug manufacturers. Just prior
to his 2017 selection as WHO Director-General, Dr. Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus stated that he was “committed to transforming the way that WHO
operates. A more effective and efficient WHO will strengthen the entire U.N.
system. . . . Too often, human rights and gender equity are secondary
considerations when U.N. organizations develop programming. This is outdated
and must change.”195 Although Dr. Tedros was mainly referring to an
individual’s right to health,196 his statement underscores the important role that
international organizations, including the WHO, play in not only the protection,
but promotion, of human rights.
The WHO was created as a norm-setting agency, with human rights at the
organization’s core.197 The WHO Constitution begins with the proclamation that
“[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being . . . .”198 Although historically the
WHO’s human rights focus has been on the right to health, there is a need for it
to expand the rights it protects and promotes in a way that is commensurate with
its growing authority. By failing to provide Prequalification applicants the
ability to challenge an adverse decision, the WHO has not only missed an
opportunity to advance human rights principles, but is actually lagging behind
some countries.

194

See supra Section I.C.
Benjamin Mason Meier, Human Rights in the World Health Organization: Views of the DirectorGeneral Candidates, 19 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 293, 294 (2017).
196
Id.
197
See generally L.O. Gostin et al., The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization, 129 PUB.
HEALTH 854, 855 (2015) (discussing the mission, authority, and functions of the WHO).
198
CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62
Stat. 2679.
195
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For example, a manufacturer who applies to have its drug approved by the
European Medicines Agency199 may have a denial reviewed by the European
Court of Justice.200 Similarly, in the United States, manufacturers whose
applications for generic drug approval201 are denied or withdrawn may either
request a hearing with the FDA or seek judicial review in a U.S. court of
appeals.202 If an applicant opts for a hearing with the FDA and is still displeased
with the agency’s decision, it retains the ability to appeal that decision to a U.S.
court of appeals.203 It should be noted, however, that courts accord FDA
decisions substantial deference.204 Courts also do not perform their own factfinding, but rather review only the information that the agency possessed at the
time it made its decision.205 These examples demonstrate that the WHO has thus
far missed an opportunity to promote robust due process protections.
The WHO should allow manufacturers whose drugs are denied
prequalification or delisted the opportunity to challenge such a decision due also
to the great power the Prequalification Program holds over many manufacturers.
In 1928, Clyde Eagleton wrote that “[p]ower breeds responsibility” to describe

199
This is specifically referring to the Centralized Procedure. Similar to the Prequalification Program,
approval through the Centralized Procedure enables entities to effectively gain authorization to distribute (or
market) their product in multiple countries. Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 31 March 2004 Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorisation and Supervision of
Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, 2004 O.J.
(L 136) 1 (EC); Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on
the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 (EC); Vilas-Boas &
Tharp, supra note 164.
200
Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Comm’n of the European Communities, 2002 E.C.R. II-4948, II4952, II-5019–21; see Levan Makhashvili & Paul Stephenson, Differentiating Agency Independence:
Perceptions from Inside the European Medicines Agency, 9 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 4, 9–10 (2013) (citing R.
Daniel Kelemen, The Politics of ‘Eurocratic’ Structure and the New European Agencies, 25 W. EUR. POL. 93,
99 (2002) (“In addition, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) monitors the actions and decisions of the EMA
([European Medicines Agency]) and, at the request of EU institutions or citizens, can further scrutinise its
functioning.”)); Johannes Saurer, The Accountability of Supranational Administration: The Case of European
Union Agencies, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 429, 461–62 (2009) (providing an overview of the EMA-specific
jurisprudence on when an action may be challenged in court).
201
The discussion of the FDA approval process will focus exclusively on the FDA review of generic drug
applications. This is done for two reasons: (1) the review procedure at this stage of the process is substantially
similar for brand name and generic manufacturers that an examination of one will suffice; and (2) most of the
drugs that are prequalified by the WHO are generic products. Worku et al., supra note 103, at 63–64.
202
21 C.F.R. § 314.200(c)(1) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 314.235(b) (2018).
203
21 C.F.R. § 314.235(b).
204
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (“[W]hen resolution of that
question depends on ‘engineering and scientific’ considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s technical
expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without substantial basis in fact.”).
205
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212, 216 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
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states’ responsibilities under international law.206 Scholars began to apply this
idea to international organizations, as their roles and powers expanded.207 As
international organizations increasingly act in ways that affect the “social,
political, economic and legal status of individuals,” their responsibility to be
accountable for their decisions increases as well.208 The WHO—in deciding to
award prequalification to a manufacturer—consistently makes decisions that
have a significant impact on an applicant’s profitability and sustainability.209
Due to this power, the WHO’s Prequalification Program should have structural
mechanisms in place to make it more accountable for its decisions. Allowing
manufacturers whose drugs are denied prequalification or delisted the
opportunity to challenge such a decision would ensure the WHO is promoting
human rights and help alleviate concerns that it is unaccountable.
III. WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: A MODEL FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW
The WHO is not the only international organization to face calls for the
introduction of a review body.210 In 1993, the World Bank’s Board of Executive
Directors211 created an Inspection Panel in response to charges—both internal
and external—that the Bank was not considering the sometimes negative social
and environmental effects of the loans it was administering.212 This Comment
will look to the World Bank Inspection Panel to offer lessons on how to structure
the proposed WHO Prequalification independent review panel.
The Inspection Panel is made up of a diverse group of appointed individuals.
The President of the World Bank nominates three people from different states,
and then the panelists are appointed by the Executive Directors to serve non-

206
CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (1928); see also
Clarke, supra note 29, at 65.
207
Clarke, supra note 29, at 65 (citing E. Paasivirta & P.J. Kujjper, Does One Size Fit All?: The European
Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 169, 173 (2005)).
208
Id. (quoting Gerhard Hafner, Accountability of International Organizations—A Critical View, in
TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM 585, 592–93, 629 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 2005)).
209
See supra Section I.C.
210
Granted, at least some of those calls to the WHO are coming from this Comment.
211
The World Bank is a global partnership with 189 member countries dedicated to reducing poverty by
providing zero or low interest loans, credits, grants, and technical assistance to developing countries. Who We
Are, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
212
Yvonne Wong & Benoit Mayer, The World Bank’s Inspectional Panel: A Tool for Accountability?, in
6 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW 495, 496 (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2015).
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renewable five year terms.213 The Panel is tasked with receiving and
investigating allegations that the World Bank has not complied with “its
operational policies and procedures.”214 The Inspection Panel can consider
claims brought by (1) at least two individuals affected by the project, (2) an
entity representing affected individuals, or (3) the Executive Director or Board
of Executive Directors, which can order the Panel to investigate a certain loan.215
Prior to bringing a claim, there is an exhaustion of remedies requirement:
individuals or representative claimants must assert that they have brought their
concerns to Bank Management, and—in the complainant’s view—the
Management’s response was inadequate.216 The Panel is an investigatory body,
whose ultimate goal is to bring World Bank projects into conformity with its
own operational policies and procedures.217 Therefore, the Panel does not
compensate individuals who have been negatively affected by a loan.218 Rather,
it presents its findings to the World Bank’s Board, which then decides how to
proceed.219 Panel proceedings typically lead to an action plan, which on occasion
has included the cancellation or revocation of funding for the project in
question.220
While not perfect, the Inspection Panel has been credited with bringing about
more careful decision-making and encouraging the Bank to take corrective
actions. First, the mere presence of the Panel encourages staff to be more
cognizant of the Bank’s policies and to more diligently monitor their projects.221
Second, the Panel’s findings can prompt the Board of Executive Directors to
take corrective action when a project is not in full compliance.222
The Inspection Panel, however, has also faced criticism that its practices
both limit utilization and participation and raise questions about the Panel
members’ independence. According to some, there are linguistic and cultural
barriers that impede people from filing claims, which may ultimately result in

213
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Res. 93-10 (Sept. 22, 1993), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf; THE WORLD
BANK, THE INSPECTION PANEL: ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 2017–JUNE 30, 2018, at 5 (2018).
214
Wong & Mayer, supra note 212.
215
Id. at 502.
216
Id. at 503.
217
Id. at 514–15.
218
Id. at 514.
219
Id. at 515.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 516–17.
222
Id. at 516.
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underutilization of the Panel.223 Additionally, some claimants have stated that
they are largely sidelined during the Panel’s investigation and deliberation
processes.224 Finally, there have been doubts about the true independence of the
Panel since panelists are appointed by the Executive Director and claims must
be approved by the Board of Executive Directors to proceed.225 The experience
of the Inspection Panel can provide guidance on how to structure the proposed
Prequalification independent review panel.

IV. A TWO-PART SOLUTION TO THE PREQUALIFICATION CHALLENGES
This Comment proposes a two-part solution to address both the international
due process concerns and the lack of pharmaceutical production in low-income
countries. First, as discussed above, the WHO should allow drug manufacturers
whose drugs are denied prequalification or delisted the opportunity to be heard
in front of an independent panel. Second, the WHO should institute a procedure
that enables manufacturers in lower income countries to have their drugs
“conditionally” prequalified. Conditional prequalification would require
manufacturers to meet a lower defined threshold of GMP compliance that
ensures manufacturers’ facilities have basic quality control mechanisms. The
prequalification is “conditional” because manufacturers’ approval for a drug is
contingent upon their adherence to a plan, approved by the WHO, that leads to
full GMP compliance within a defined time period. This Comment will now
address these two parts in turn.
A. Prequalification Independent Review Panel
The WHO should create a review panel comprised of an odd number of
independent experts that—upon request from manufacturers—will review
decisions to withdraw or deny prequalification. As explained below, an
independent review panel would not only provide manufacturers with robust due
process protections, but also ensure the accuracy of prequalification decisions,
increase the accountability of Prequalification staff members, and instill more
confidence in the decisions of the Prequalification team.
Beginning with the composition of the panel, the WHO Prequalification
independent review panel should adopt the approach of the World Bank

223
Id. at 507–08 (noting that the World Bank’s working language is English, and filing a claim against an
authority may run counter to the norms and values of some cultures).
224
Id. at 511–12.
225
Id. at 510–12.
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Inspection Panel with respect to diversity of representation and term limits.226 It
is important that the Prequalification Review Panel represent a geographically
and economically diverse group of countries to encourage the greatest level of
actual and perceived independence, fairness, and credibility. The following
example could be one way to achieve such a panel.
The panel could consist of seven people, each serving a term of five years.
The panelists’ terms would be staggered to ensure panel continuity.227
Individuals would be allowed to serve more than once, but not in successive
terms. One panelist would come from each of the six WHO regions: the African
Region, Region of the Americas, South-East Asia Region, European Region,
Eastern Mediterranean Region, and Western Pacific Region.228 The seventh and
final panelist would be appointed by the U.N. agencies that procure prequalified
drugs. The seventh panelist could—but would not be required to—be an
employee of a U.N. agency. All of the panelists should have expertise in the area
of pharmaceuticals. Similar to criticisms of the World Bank Inspection Panel,229
questions may be raised about the independence of the panelists. To assuage
some of these concerns, there could be a cooling-off rule for regional panelists:
individuals are not eligible to be a regional panelist for some specified period
(e.g., five years) after they have been directly employed by the WHO or served
on a Prequalification assessment or inspection team. These measures would
satisfy the international law requirement of providing applicants a hearing before
an independent and impartial tribunal.230
Applicant manufacturers would be able to bring before the panel challenges
based on a rejection of their dossier or a finding of noncompliance with the
GMPs. There would, however, be an exhaustion of remedies requirement,
similar to the World Bank Inspection Panel.231 The manufacturer would be
required to raise its concerns with the Prequalification team and make a good
faith effort to resolve any disputes before filing a claim with the independent
panel. For the panel to overturn a prequalification decision, at least 60% of the

226

See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
The staggering of terms would, of course, require some of the initial panelists to serve less than fiveyear terms (e.g., two initial panelists serve three-year terms, two serve four-year terms, and the other three serve
for the full five years).
228
WHO Regional Offices, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/regions/en/ (last visited Nov.
25, 2018).
229
See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
230
See supra Section II.A.
231
Supra Part III. The FDA and the European Court of Human Rights appeal procedures contain a similar
requirement. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 121, at art. 26 (“The Commission may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted . . . .”); supra Section II.D.
227
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panelists would need to vote in favor of such a measure.232 Requiring a 60%
threshold for reversals is intended to guard from an overly active panel and build
in limited deference to the Prequalification team.
For products that are delisted, the panel could either uphold or reverse the
WHO’s decision. The panel would uphold the delisting of a product when it
agrees with the Prequalification team that there are immediate deficiencies in
the safety or effectiveness of a product. The panel would reverse the WHO’s
delisting of a product—and restore its prequalification status—when the
evidence indicates that the product remains both safe and effective, and is
manufactured in compliance with GMPs.
For manufacturers that are applying to have their product(s) prequalified, the
panel could (1) uphold the Prequalification team’s decision, (2) reverse a denial
and grant prequalification, (3) grant the proposed “conditional” approval that
will be discussed in section B of this Part, or (4) change the Prequalification
team’s grant of conditional prequalification to “full” prequalification.233 First,
the panel would uphold a WHO denial of prequalification when there are
material deficiencies in the applicant’s dossier submission or noncompliance
with GMPs. Second, the panel would reverse a WHO denial of Prequalification
if it determines the facts clearly show that an applicant’s dossier submission and
manufacturing facilities comply with the Prequalification requirements. Third,
the panel could grant conditional approval if the manufacturer’s dossier
submission is satisfactory, the manufacturer is from an eligible country,234 and
its compliance with GMPs is not fully satisfied but meets the minimum standards
discussed in section B of this Part. Finally, the panel would change a conditional
prequalification result to full prequalification if it determines there is clear
evidence demonstrating that the applicant’s dossier submission and compliance
with GMPs warrant such a change.
In deciding what information to review, the panel should adopt the approach
of U.S. courts235 and review only the information that the Prequalification team
possessed at the time it made its decision.236 Limiting the reviewable information
232
For a full panel of seven individuals, five of the seven panelists would need to vote in favor of
overturning the prequalification decision. However, if one or more panelist were absent, the required number of
votes would change accordingly.
233
“Full” prequalification refers to the current prequalification granted by the WHO. It is used to
distinguish between the proposed “conditional prequalification” and the current system.
234
See infra Section IV.B.
235
See supra Section II.D.
236
Accordingly, the Panel would not make a site or inspection visit to the facility, but would rely on the
report of the inspection team.
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to only what is contained in the administrative record safeguards against lengthy
and costly discovery and litigation.237 A lack of financial and human resources
is already a concern for both the WHO238 and many manufacturers.239 Therefore,
a procedure that is efficient, in terms of cost and time, is in the best interests of
all parties.
The Panel, however, should depart from U.S. courts’ high level of agency
deference,240 and review each case de novo. A primary justification for U.S.
courts’ deference to agency decisions is that judges do not possess the same
expertise as agency officials.241 Here, the Prequalification Panel would be
comprised of subject matter experts. Thus, the justification of deferring to the
agency—in this case the WHO Prequalification team—is absent.
As discussed in Part III above, international law principles require the WHO
to provide manufacturers whose products have been denied prequalification or
delisted an opportunity for a hearing before a competent, independent, and
impartial body. The independent review panel would satisfy this obligation.
Such a Panel would also bring practical benefits. First, the Panel would ensure
that prequalification decisions are accurate. It logically follows that having a
group of seven widely respected subject matter experts review a decision would
increase its accuracy. Second, similar to the World Bank Inspection Panel, the
mere existence of the Prequalification Panel puts additional pressure on the
Prequalification team to take care in its decisions to prequalify drugs or not. The
possibility of bad publicity and loss of credibility associated with prequalifying
an unsafe drug is likely to safeguard against the Prequalification team overapproving applications in an effort to avoid having decisions overturned by the
Panel. Finally, stemming from these first two benefits, manufacturers would
likely have more confidence in, and respect for, the decisions of the
Prequalification team, if they had the opportunity to appeal negative decisions.
It is possible that this confidence would increase the number of manufacturers
from across the world—including lower income countries—that apply for
prequalification. Even so, it would likely take more than the creation of an
appeals process to facilitate the production of quality drugs in lower income

237
See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1, 7 (2013) (discussing the costs and inefficiencies of litigation).
238
Eigil Sørensen, Challenges for the World Health Organization, J. NOR. MED. ASS’N (Jan. 2018),
https://tidsskriftet.no/en/2018/01/kronikk/challenges-world-health-organization.
239
See, e.g., Brhilikova et al., supra note 9, at 8 (discussing the problems encountered in the authors’
Nepali study, including “financial constraints”).
240
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
241
See, e.g., id. at 865.
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countries. A modified prequalification process available to manufacturers based
in these countries, such as the proposed condition prequalification, has the
potential to do just that: increase the supply of quality-assured medicines
produced in lower income countries.
B. Conditional Prequalification
Conditional prequalification would be an approval pathway available only
to manufacturers producing FPPs and APIs in lower income countries. For their
drugs to be conditionally prequalified, manufacturers in these countries would
be required to meet a defined threshold of GMP compliance that is below what
is required for full prequalification, but one that ensures the drugs are safe and
effective, and that the facilities in which they are produced have basic quality
control mechanisms in place. The prequalification would be conditioned upon
manufacturers adhering to a WHO-approved plan that leads to full compliance
within a specified period.
The criteria used to determine the countries in which manufacturers would
be eligible for conditional prequalification would mirror the economic standards
used by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.242 The Gavi eligibility criteria generally
capture countries that have the highest disease burdens and lowest drug
production rates.243 To be eligible for conditional prequalification, the
manufacturer’s drugs would have to be produced in a country with an average
gross national income per capita of $1,580 or less over the past three years.244
The $1,580 figure would be the 2018 level, subsequently adjusted annually for
inflation. Currently, manufacturers in forty-seven countries would be eligible for
conditional prequalification.245 The Gavi level of $1,580 is desirable for
conditional prequalification because it includes not only “low-income”
countries246 but also a limited number of poorer “middle-income” countries, as
242
“Gavi is an international organisation - a global Vaccine Alliance, bringing together public and private
sectors with the shared goal of creating equal access to new and underused vaccines for children living in the
world’s poorest countries.” About Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, GAVI, VACCINE ALLIANCE, http://www.gavi.org/
about/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). In addition to having a certain three-year gross national income per capita,
countries applying for Gavi support must also satisfy other criteria, as dictated by the specific vaccine they are
applying for. See Transition Process, GAVI, VACCINE ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/support/sustainability/
transition-process/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
243
See Gavi’s Mission, GAVI, VACCINE ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/about/mission/ (last visited Nov.
25, 2018).
244
Countries Eligible for Support, GAVI, VACCINE ALLIANCE, http://www.gavi.org/support/sustainability/
countries-eligible-for-support/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
245
Id.
246
Under 2019 fiscal year classifications, countries with a gross national income per capita below $995
are classified as low-income. World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, https://datahelpdesk.
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classified by the World Bank.247 Making manufacturers in all middle-income
countries eligible for conditional prequalification would be overly inclusive as
the economic conditions in these countries vary significantly: middle-income
countries are defined as having a gross national income per capita between $996
to $12,055.248 Manufacturers in a country such as India—a middle-income
country with a well-developed generic pharmaceutical industry—do not need
the conditional prequalification approval pathway.249 If a country’s gross
national income per capita increases above the threshold level, that country will
“graduate,” and no new manufacturers based in these countries will be eligible
for conditional prequalification. If a manufacturer has multiple facilities, only
some of which are in eligible countries, only the drugs produced in the eligible
countries may be conditionally prequalified.
For a manufacturer to take advantage of conditional prequalification, both
the FPP and its API must be produced in an eligible country. It is not necessary
that the same manufacturer produce both the API and FPP—just that both are
produced in eligible countries. If both are produced in eligible countries but by
different manufacturers, both the API and the FPP would be eligible for
conditional prequalification. This requirement ensures that the benefits of local
production of medicines are largely captured. If conditional prequalification
only required that the FPP be produced in an eligible country, it is conceivable
that much of the actual production of the drug would occur outside an eligible
country and then be shipped into an eligible country for the final step of
production. In this scenario, the economic benefits of local production would be
reduced and the populations in lower income countries would still be susceptible
to supply interruptions because the ingredients would have to be imported.
Alternatively, allowing an API to be conditionally prequalified and then shipped
out of an eligible country for final assembly is no different—from the
consumer’s perspective—from a drug that was produced entirely outside of an
eligible country. Therefore, to be eligible for conditional prequalification, both
the FPP and its API must be produced in eligible countries.
The other requirements manufacturers would have to meet for their drugs to
gain conditional prequalification would be identical to those for full

worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (last visited Nov. 25,
2018).
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
See Vanaja Krishnan, India’s Pharmaceutical Market Set to Hit $100bn by 2025, EUR. PHARM. REV.
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.europeanpharmaceuticalreview.com/news/65288/indias-pharmaceutical-100bn/.
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prequalification except in regard to GMP standards.250 The GMP standards
would be the only difference between conditional and full prequalification for
two primary reasons: (1) it does not appear that all deviations from full GMP
compliance represent a safety risk251 and (2) GMP compliance is a particularly
difficult step in the prequalification process for many manufacturers based in
lower income countries.252
The GMP standards for conditional prequalification would not be as
stringent as current WHO GMP standards, but would be strong enough to
provide acceptable assurances that conditionally prequalified drugs are safe.
This Comment will not propose specifics regarding the minimum standards that
manufacturers would have to meet to be conditionally prequalified. That is a
determination undoubtedly best left to experts, such as the WHO Expert
Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations. But one way in
which quality could be ensured is through the more frequent submission—
compared to that required for full prequalification—of product samples to allow
for consistent testing of a product’s safety.
It appears that not all facilities which fail to comply with the full WHO
GMPs are in danger of producing unsafe drugs, as demonstrated by a study
conducted in Kenya.253 In an effort to bring drug manufacturers in the country
into compliance with WHO GMPs, the research team in the Kenya study initially
examined the current manufacturing practices of seven Kenyan pharmaceutical
companies and assessed each company’s compliance with WHO GMP
standards.254 As part of the study, the team divided GMP compliance into two
broad categories: “site” compliance and “quality management system”
compliance.255 Site refers primarily to the “physical . . . premises, utilities and
equipment used for pharmaceutical manufacturing.”256 It includes aspects
ranging from whether the facility has designated, self-contained areas where
hazardous products are produced to whether there is sufficient space at the

250
Thus, for example, the requirements a manufacturer’s product dossier would need to meet would be
identical regardless of whether the manufacturer was granted full or conditional prequalification.
251
See KAY WEYER ET AL., U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG., KENYA GMP ROADMAP: A STEPWISE APPROACH FOR
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TO ATTAIN WHO GMP STANDARDS 12 (2014).
252
Chimezie Anyakora et al., Cost Benefit of Investment on Quality in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing:
WHO GMP Pre- and Post-Certification of a Nigerian Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, 17 BMC HEALTH SERV.
RES. 665 (2017); supra Section I.E.
253
WEYER ET AL., supra note 251.
254
Id. at 5, 13.
255
Id. at 10.
256
Id.
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site.257 The quality management system, on the other hand, refers to “all
documentation systems and procedures used by a company to ensure GMP
compliance,”258 including things such as the establishment of product sampling
procedures and frequencies.259
The team assigned a score of 1, 2, or 3 for both site and quality management
system compliance, with a 1 corresponding to general compliance with WHO
GMPs for that indicator, and a 3 representing inadequate compliance.260
Companies tended to score better on the quality management system variable
than the site variable.261 A company that had “[a] systematic approach in line
with WHO GMP[s] in place and implemented” (a score of 1 on quality
management system) and a “[s]ite [that] shows significant deficiencies from
WHO GMP, but does not impair production safety” (a score of 2 on site) would
not be fully compliant with WHO GMPs.262 Thus, their drugs would not be
prequalified.263 Manufacturers that fall into this category would be prime
candidates for conditional prequalification because production safety would not
be impaired.
A manufacturer whose product meets the conditional prequalification
minimum standards would be required to adhere to a WHO-approved plan that
would bring its facilities and operations into compliance with the full GMPs
within a specified time period. Repeated failures to meet the goals in the
approved plan could result in the WHO cancelling or withdrawing its conditional
prequalification until the manufacturer makes the necessary changes. The
WHO’s decision to withdraw a product’s conditional prequalification would, at
the manufacturer’s request, be subject to review by the Prequalification
independent review panel.
Conditional prequalification has the potential to increase the supply of—and
subsequent access to—essential medicines, help develop the pharmaceutical
industries in lower income countries, bring economic benefits to these countries,
and incentivize manufacturers in lower income countries to fully comply with
WHO GMPs. Because of the potential of conditional prequalification, drug
purchasers, pharmaceutical manufacturers in lower income countries, and the
general population in these countries—particularly individuals in need of
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 27.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 10–12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 7, 12.
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essential medicines—would all likely benefit from such a system. The benefits
to each of these three stakeholders will be analyzed in turn.
Drug purchasers stand to gain from a system like conditional
prequalification. As discussed in Part I, there is a shortage of high-quality
essential medicines. This inevitably leads to drug procurement entities and
LMIC governments either not purchasing enough drugs or purchasing drugs of
a questionable quality.264 Conditionally prequalified drugs would signal to
potential purchasers that a drug has been produced under regulatory oversight,
but that the GMPs followed are not quite as rigorous as those followed by fully
prequalified drugs. This represents a significant improvement over the status
quo, in which people in need either go without essential medicines because of a
shortage or only have access to medicines of an unknown quality.
Current and potential pharmaceutical manufacturers in lower income
countries would also benefit from conditional prequalification because they
would gain immediate and long-term access to additional segments of the
essential medicines market. Manufacturers would likely have immediate access
to a greater share of the market because they could demonstrate that their drugs
were produced under some level of regulatory oversight. At the same time,
manufacturers whose drugs are conditionally prequalified would be incentivized
to have their products achieve full prequalification. Moreover, manufacturers
whose drugs are conditionally prequalified would be incentivized to have their
products achieve full prequalification because procurement entities would likely
purchase prequalified drugs before conditional ones, and noncompliance with
the WHO-approved plan to achieve full prequalification would be grounds for
revoking a product’s conditional status. Once these manufacturers achieve full
prequalification, they would then gain access to the important international drug
procurement entities market. Access to these additional segments of the market
could lead to a significant expansion of the pharmaceutical industry in lower
income countries. This expansion would bring with it attendant economic
benefits, namely “enhanced exports, . . . emergence of supportive industries and
the reduced reliance on imports that use up precious hard currency . . . .”265
Finally, and most importantly, the general population in lower income
countries, including those currently without access to quality-assured essential
medicines, would likely benefit the most from conditional prequalification.
Conditional prequalification has the potential to both increase access to essential

264
265

See supra Section I.A.
NGOZWANA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
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medicines and bring benefits associated with a more developed pharmaceutical
industry to persons living in these countries. First, supply is a key component of
access, and conditional prequalification has the potential to increase the supply
of—and subsequent access to—drugs in lower income countries. Second, a more
developed domestic pharmaceutical industry would likely provide additional
economic opportunities for persons living in lower income countries. Higher
income is associated with better health: both at the individual and population
levels.266 Wealthier people are generally healthier than their poorer
counterparts;267 and people living in higher income countries generally enjoy
greater overall health than those living in lower income countries.268
Additionally, the overall economic benefits attached to the growth of a domestic
pharmaceutical industry has the potential to lead to greater individual purchasing
power and increased government subsidization of essential medicines.
Therefore, the introduction of a conditional prequalification pathway has the
potential to benefit drug purchasers, pharmaceutical manufacturers in lower
income countries, and the general population in these countries but particularly
those in need of essential medicines.
CONCLUSION
WHO’s Prequalification Program has contributed greatly to improving the
quality of essential medicines purchased by international donors and drug
procurement entities. Due to the market share these donors and procurers
occupy, as well as the fact that many of them require the drugs they purchase to
be prequalified, the Prequalification Program has become akin to a drug
approval authority in many LMICs.
Stemming from this authority to take actions that adversely affect applicants,
the Prequalification Program is obligated to respect international due process
principles, including the guarantee of a fair trial. Instituting an independent
review panel before which manufacturers whose products are denied
prequalification or delisted could appeal their cases would ensure the program
is respecting these principles. Creating an independent review panel would also

266

See infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
Fiona Imlach Gunasekara et al., Change in Income and Change in Self-Rated Health: Systematic
Review of Studies Using Repeated Measures to Control for Confounding Bias, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 193, 201
(2011) (finding “a small positive association” between individual income increase and self-rated health, based
on thirteen studies conducted in four different countries).
268
Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an Epidemiologist, HEALTH AFF. 31,
37 (2002) (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1993)).
267
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align with the WHO’s role as a promoter of human rights and be commensurate
with the great power it exerts over many manufacturers.
Although important from a human rights perspective, it is unclear whether
the independent review panel alone would increase access to essential
medicines. One way to improve access to essential medicines is by strengthening
the domestic manufacturing capacity in countries with the highest disease
burden. Unfortunately, nearly all the FPPs and APIs that have been prequalified
have been produced by manufacturers in middle- and high-income countries. By
adopting a procedure like conditional prequalification, the WHO would increase
the likelihood that a pharmaceutical industry capable of producing qualityassured medicines develops in these lower income countries. Conditional
prequalification could also help ensure that individuals living in these countries
enjoy greater access to essential medicines and the economic benefits that come
with a developed pharmaceutical industry.
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